Delhi–Dhaka ties are facing a litmus test as 2025 ended. The India–Bangladesh tensions in 2025 have become a new ingredient in an already unstable South Asia, following the four‑day India–Pakistan war in May 2025. Once a stable relationship, the engagement between India and Bangladesh has deteriorated rapidly into a quagmire of diplomatic showdowns, mutual accusations, and nationalistic media broadcasts over the past few weeks. A Parliamentary panel in India has described the current situation with Bangladesh as the most significant strategic challenge since 1971, despite India’s crucial role in supporting Bangladesh’s liberation from the pogrom inflicted by the Pakistani army on its own citizens, the Bengalis in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.

Times have changed, and geopolitics is taking unpredictable turns. The ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024 through a student‑led violent protest, followed by the induction of the interim government headed by Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus—who visibly does not view India as a close partner, has clearly worked against India’s interests. Politically, matters are taking an increasingly ugly turn. China’s growing footprint in Dhaka and Bangladesh’s warming ties with Pakistan, India’s hostile neighbor, are no longer hidden.

The assassination of Osman Hadi is likely only a trigger, perhaps a convenient one, for hyper‑nationalist, power‑hungry Islamic protestor groups in Bangladesh, which are resorting to mobocracy, demagoguery, jingoism and violence including religiously motivated mob lynching.

Killing of Osman Hadi, The Trigger

Sharif Osman Hadi succumbed to his injuries while receiving treatment at a hospital in Singapore, after being shot by masked shooters in Bangladesh as he was leaving a mosque. Hadi was a key figure in the violent student unrest that contributed to the ouster of the elected Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who fled for safety and subsequently took shelter in India. Hadi had also been preparing to contest the upcoming national elections independently.

In the wake of what appears to be a politically motivated killing, certain student political groups claimed, albeit indirectly, the possible involvement of Indian intelligence agencies or alleged that India is providing shelter to the killers. These claims quickly gained traction, spreading like wildfire across Bangladesh. The interim government’s conspicuous silence and reluctance to counter these unsubstantiated and unverified allegations fueled the rising tensions, allowing unrest to escalate in Dhaka and several other parts of Bangladesh, including the mob lynching of two Hindu Bangladeshis.

“Bangladeshi parties should avoid taking rhetorical shots at New Delhi in order to score nationalist points with voters”.

International Crisis Group- Brussels

The International Crisis Group in Brussels has advised Bangladesh to refrain from throwing rhetorical attacks on India and to restore control over its internal turmoil, which is appropriate and timely. However, it has also, somewhat surprisingly, urged India not to repeatedly criticise the Bangladeshi interim government for banning Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League, even though India’s concerns over this injustice are valid and legitimate. Such advice to India appears disingenuous.

“New Delhi should avoid wading further into the debate over the restrictions on the Awami League, even though India’s concerns have some merit,”

International Crisis Group- Brussels

Bangladeshi media continues to broadcast theories that Osman Hadi’s killers escaped into the Indian state of Meghalaya, despite the absence of evidence. India’s Border Security Force (BSF) has firmly denied these claims and dismissed the speculation.

On 17 December 2025, a large mob gathered in front of the Indian Assistant High Commission in Chittagong and began pelting stones at the building, causing minor damage as part of a protest against the killing of Osman Hadi. In response, India summoned the Bangladeshi envoy in New Delhi and lodged strong concerns regarding the security arrangements for Indian diplomatic missions in Bangladesh. Additionally, India has temporarily suspended visa services in Bangladesh due to these security concerns.

The Mathematics of Politics inside Bangladesh

The biggest beneficiary of the unfolding crisis initially appeared to be the interim government led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus. However, that prospect now looks less certain following the dramatic return of Tarique Rahman (widely known in Bangladesh as Tarique Zia). His re‑entry into national politics after 17 years in exile has now altered the political landscape and may lie at the heart of the current turbulence.

The Awami League, led by ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, now under refuge in India has been barred from contesting the upcoming national election. This effectively positions the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) as the potential contender and the most likely winner. Such an outcome would pose a direct threat to Muhammad Yunus, and the student-led mob forces whose ascent to power in 2024 was propelled by jingoism & mobocracy. These groups have since consolidated themselves into a political formation known as the National Citizen Party (NCP).

BNP’s resurgence had two problems. First is the ill health of Khaleda Zia, the party’s chairperson and former prime minister of Bangladesh, who had been unable to lead election campaign activities due to critical health conditions. However, this challenge has now taken a decisive turn with Khaleda Zia passing away on 30 December 2025 after a prolonged illness, an important event that is reshaping the anatomy of politics inside Dhaka and has triggered nationwide mourning. Second, her son Tarique Rahman was absent, and that was the weak point earlier, but he is now present in Dhaka, bringing new challenges to the aspirations of the student‑led mob politics and their beneficiaries.

In this context, the student‑driven National Citizen Party (NCP), informally aligned with the Yunus administration, faces a significant strategic threat, i.e. to be thrown out of relevance, once BNP comes to power. NCP lacks a vote bank, has minimal governance experience, and has limited influence on core public concerns such as development, services, economic stability, or long‑term policy planning. To offset these weaknesses, NCP appears to be leaning heavily on an aggressive mobocracy built around jingoism and anti‑India rhetoric, an emotionally charged narrative designed to amalgamate disparate voter segments behind a singular cause.

But now, Tariq Ahmed has returned to Bangladesh after 17 years of exile. Such tactics by NCP could only marginally strengthen their electoral prospects, enabling it to secure a handful of seats. When combined with victories by independent candidates (like late Osman Hadi) this could allow NCP to form a pressure group within the next Parliament.

Even in a scenario where BNP forms the government, such a bloc could still aim to act as an aggressive political lever, potentially try to transition Muhammad Yunus from interim chief adviser to a more permanent national role, i.e. the presidency, again, by escalating mobocracy, combined with voices withing the parliament. Of course, the demagoguery against India may again ignite unrest & pseudo-nationalism within Bangladesh time to time.

That, at present, remains the most plausible interpretation of the political choreography unfolding in Bangladesh. Yet the picture is far from complete. Deeper, more complex issues linger beneath the surface, ranging from the strategic sensitivities around St. Martin’s Island & US interest in it, to alleged ISI footprints and China’s expanding presence in Dhaka. Each of these factors warrants scrutiny, and none can be dismissed outright. Their potential involvement, whether through financing, strategic guidance, or softer forms of political encouragement, use of social media as a tool to create unrest in Dhaka, cannot be ruled out, particularly in a climate where instability serves multiple external interests.

Refuge to Sheikh Hasina, The Root Cause of Anti-India Emotions

India has granted shelter to the ousted Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina upon her request and has, so far, not accepted the extradition request submitted by the interim government of Bangladesh. While New Delhi has acknowledged receiving the request, it has not issued a formal response.

The interpretation of the India–Bangladesh Extradition Treaty (2013) is complex. Articles 6(1) and 8(3) permit India to refuse extradition if the alleged offences are political in nature or if the accused can reasonably convince that extradition would be unjust or oppressive under the prevailing circumstances. However, Bangladeshi authorities have charged Sheikh Hasina with murder and crimes against humanity, and Article 6(2) of the bilateral treaty explicitly states that such offences shall not be considered political. This creates a legal confusion that complicates the treaty’s interpretation & implementation.

A key debate within Indian legal and political circles concerns whether the 2013 extradition treaty should be interpreted alone or should be read together with the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, to reach a conclusion that respects legal obligations while accounting for geopolitical and humanitarian considerations.

Under Section 31(1)(c) of the Indian Extradition Act 1962, a fugitive shall not be surrendered if the offence is of a “political character.” Additionally, Indian law allows refusal when the accused faces the death penalty, unless the requesting state provides guarantee that the death sentence will not be carried out. India can also decline extradition requests arising from political persecution or where there is a credible likelihood that the individual will not receive a fair trial.

“Yes, we have received the request, and this request is being examined as part of ongoing judicial and internal legal processes. We remain committed to the best interests of the people of Bangladesh, including peace, democracy, inclusion and stability in that country and will continue to engage constructively in this regard with all stakeholders. India supports free & fair election in Bangladesh”

“In the last few days, we have issued more than a couple of statements rejecting the false narrative being projected in Bangladesh. We condemn the recent gruesome killing of a Hindu youth in Mymensingh and expect the perpetrators of the crime to be brought to justice. These incidents cannot be brushed aside.”

Ministry of External Affairs, India

The death penalty verdict delivered by the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) in Dhaka is being criticized by Ms. Sheikh Hasina, who has described it as biased, undemocratic and lacking proper legal procedure before reaching a conclusion. India has responded cautiously, stating that it has “noted” the verdict. Experts observe that Indian politics remains calm and mature, and they recognize that the decision appears to reflect a hurried attempt to reach a predetermined outcome rather than an unbiased, constitutional, democratic, legal, and inclusive process.

“India understands this [Hasina’s case] to be political vindictiveness of the ruling political forces in Bangladesh,”

Sanjay Bhardwaj, professor of South Asian Studies at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University

It appears highly improbable under any circumstances that India would jeopardize its credibility by surrendering Ms. Hasina to a perfidious judicial outcome in Dhaka, or by endorsing a biased legal process shaped by the ISI playbook or China’s coercive pressure tactics or probable CIA strategies. Instead, India is expected to undertake a multifaceted array of diplomatic and strategic maneuvers marked by precise geopolitical recalibration, to restore relations with Bangladesh, mitigate hostilities, safeguard bilateral trade, and counteract the encroachment of external influences in Dhaka that threaten Indian interests.

Religion Based Mob Lynching of 2 Hindus in Bangladesh

Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal publicly expressed “grave concern” over the ongoing “persistent hostilities” against Hindus, Christians and Buddhists and strongly condemned the brutal killings of Hindu men such as Dipu Chandra Das in Mymensingh, who was beaten to death, tied to a tree and set on fire. During the same unrest, the lynching of Amrit Mandal in Rajbari further increased India’s concern about the safety of Hindu minorities.

New Delhi’s criticism stems not only from humanitarian concern but also from its broader responsibility to speak out when targeted violence against vulnerable communities becomes persistent, grave, and insufficiently addressed by the interim government of Bangladesh. This posture echoes India’s stance in 1971, when it intervened to halt the genocide and pogroms inflicted by the Pakistan Army on the people of then East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh). The influx of refugees primarily minorities fleeing mass atrocities had destabilized India’s border regions, prompting New Delhi to support the Mukti Bahini, enter the conflict, and ultimately help secure Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971.

India is determined not to see a repeat of such circumstances today. It expects Bangladesh to remain a democratic, peaceful, development‑driven neighbor that maintains constructive relations with all countries while refraining from actions or rhetoric that undermine India’s security interests, whether through provocative statements about strategic regions such as the Siliguri Corridor or grandiose claims of being the “guardian” of the Bay of Bengal.

What are India’s Vulnerabilities amid an unstable Bangladesh?

India’s narrow 22 km Siliguri Corridor (“Chicken’s Neck”) remains its most fragile strategic point. Instability in Bangladesh heightens the risk that hostile groups or adversarial powers could exploit Bangladeshi territory to threaten this vital corridor, especially amid China’s expanding footprint in the region. In response, India has established three new garrisons at Bamuni, Kishanganj, and Chopra to fortify this vulnerable belt, and reports indicate a fourth base may be set up in Mizoram to strengthen protection along the eastern flank.

A hostile or unstable Dhaka could again become a sanctuary for Northeast insurgent groups, as was the case before 2009. The surge in Islamist mobilization inside Bangladesh increases the risk of extremist spillover into Indian border states. For India, stabilizing Bangladesh—whether through diplomatic engagement or stronger deterrence, has become a strategic necessity. The Border Security Force (BSF) is already on heightened alert, with intensified surveillance, patrols, and border fencing activity.

Bangladesh’s growing military and infrastructure collaboration with China poses a direct strategic challenge for India. To counteract the implications of Beijing’s deepening presence, India has accelerated the strengthening of its own military posture, building new bases, improving air‑defense architecture, and issuing subtle strategic signals to deter external interference in Bangladesh’s geopolitical alignment. India’s recent test of the K-4 submarine launched nuclear capable missile further underscored its intent to signal preparedness to adversaries operating in the region.

The porous 4,096‑km India‑Bangladesh border remains vulnerable to irregular migration, smuggling, and potential refugee surges. Political unrest in Bangladesh could trigger mass inflows into Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura, fueling socio‑political friction. To mitigate these risks, India has deployed high‑tech sensors, surveillance cameras, and enhanced night‑patrolling systems across critical stretches of the border.

Deteriorating bilateral ties have already resulted in trade bottlenecks, reciprocal restrictions, and increased logistics costs. India is responding by using trade dynamics as leverage, ensuring reciprocity, and diversifying transit routes and supply chains to reduce vulnerability to political volatility in Bangladesh.

Political instability in Bangladesh threatens regional frameworks such as the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement and undermines key India‑funded connectivity projects essential for Northeast India. To safeguard these corridors, India has heightened security along transport and logistics routes running parallel to or through sensitive border zones.

Indian investments across Bangladesh’s textile and energy sectors face growing uncertainty. To prevent disruptions, New Delhi is maintaining continuous high‑level diplomatic engagement with Dhaka to ensure that existing agreements, especially long‑term power supply frameworks, remain intact.

Stalled Teesta water‑sharing negotiations and the politicization of river‑water issues continue to create mistrust. India is carefully continuing diplomatic talks on Teesta, avoiding escalation despite political turbulence in Dhaka. Coordination with the Government of West Bengal and central water bodies remains ongoing to maintain a consistent and pragmatic Indian position.

Russia’s Response: A Call for Historical Reflection

Moscow has intervened diplomatically, with Ambassador Alexander Khozin urging de-escalation and recalling the 1971 war in which India and the Soviet Union helped liberate Bangladesh. Russia is pushing for timely elections and stability and supporting India’s historic role by presenting itself as a mediator amid concerns over Dhaka’s tilt towards Pakistan.

“The sooner you reduce the tension, the better. Because, historically, since 1971, when Bangladesh gained independence, [it was] mostly because of Indian help. And Russia also supported this in this regard. And shoulder to shoulder, India, Bangladesh, and Russia, we work together,”

Ambassador Alexander Khozin

Letter from US Congress Representatives (Committee on Foreign Affairs)

On 23 December 2025, members of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs addressed a formal letter to Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, underscoring the urgent need for a free and fair democratic transition in Bangladesh. The representatives (Gregory W. Meeks, Bill Huizenga, Sydney Kamlager-Dove, Julie Johnson, Thomas R. Suozzi) stressed that the people of Bangladesh must be able to choose their next government through an election where all political parties are allowed to participate and where voters receive genuine representation. Their letter also referenced the 2024 July–August protest killings, urging Dhaka to ensure accountability for the security‑force actions or other actions that resulted in loss of life.

Significantly, the representatives warned that no free & fair election can take place if the interim government continues to suspend political parties or restarts a flawed International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) process in Dhaka, moves that they argued would undermine democratic legitimacy and cast doubt on Bangladesh’s commitment to political pluralism. The message from Washington was clear, the global community is watching, and Dhaka’s next steps will determine whether Bangladesh advances toward democratic stability or slips deeper into political uncertainty.

The Bangladeshi people deserve to be able to choose an elected government in a free and fair election in which all political parties can participate so that their voices are represented.

Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives

India-Bangladesh tensions 2025 must be extinguished by bilateral diplomatic efforts. Delhi–Dhaka ties must return to a position of stability, above all, in Bangladesh’s own interest, if the region is to avoid drifting into deeper political aggressions. The coming months will be decisive. How Dhaka and New Delhi choose to navigate this period will shape not only the trajectory of their bilateral relationship but also the broader strategic landscape of South Asia.

For Bangladesh, the stakes are unusually high. The country must rise above revenge politics, resist the pull of jingoism, curb mobocracy, and move away from demagoguery at a moment when its political transition is more fragile than at any time since 1971. It should also wisely recognize that India will inevitably recalibrate its strategic posture in response to prolonged instability across the border. New Delhi’s priority will always be to safeguard its national interests, not necessarily to undermine Bangladesh, which has never posed a significant threat to India.

In its anger toward Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh risks losing a powerful and historically reliable friend in India. India has never acted to damage Dhaka’s core interests; on the contrary, it played an instrumental role in Bangladesh’s birth in 1971 and has supported it across sectors ranging from trade and culture to education and developmental domains. That history and the goodwill should not be casually discarded.

Bangladesh would also do well not to misread India’s restraint. New Delhi’s silence, strategic patience, and refusal to be provoked by inflammatory rhetoric from certain student-led groups in Dhaka or their tacit backers should not be mistaken for indifference or weakness. It reflects a deliberate choice to avoid escalation at a volatile moment and keep the ties peaceful.

The cost of failing to rebuild trust with India will fall on both the countries, while disproportionately on Bangladesh. A continued breakdown in relations could inflict long‑term, irreversible damage on a bilateral tie that has historically delivered stability, growth, and mutual benefit. For Bangladesh, the path forward lies not in antagonism, but in friendly India.